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the Need for Comprehensive Reform
John A. Holsen (*)
Abstract: This paper discusses the prospects for economic reform in the Soviet Union and summari-
zes the recommendations that were made in a -Joint Study- by the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and
the EBRD. The paper starts with a review of recent economic trends and a discussion of political factors
which condition the economic reform effort. The economic reform program recommended by the four in-
ternational agencies is outlined under the headings of macroeconomic management, systemic reform, and
transitional measures. Because of the close inter-relationships between the policies and institutional re-
forms proposed, emphasis is placed on the need for a comprehensive reform, i.e., simultaneous or nearly
simultaneous action in many areas. This is followed with a summary of the recommendations regarding
external assistance. The paper concludes with comments on the prospects for the future.
The Beginnings of Perestroika
The decision to initiate Perestroika or economic restructuring in the mid-1980s came after it period
of declining growth rates and increasing dissatisfaction with the performance of the Soviet economy. Of-
ficial statistics indicate that real NMP (net material product) increased at 8% in the second half of the
1960s, but that the rate had fallen to about 3% in the first half of the 1980s. These official figures pro-
bably underestimate inflation and hence overestimate real growth. Real output per capita was probably
stagnant in the first half of the 1980s. Moreover, high levels of both investment and military spending res-
tricted the levels of private consumption. The economy was inefficient; investment rates were high but
growth rates were low. It was slow to introduce new technology or respond to changes in consumer de-
mand; the quality of consumer goods was generally poor.
Perestroika, accompanied by glasnost, began in 1985. In the initial years there was a substantial in-
crease in social expenditures, but little real reform of economic structures. This changed at the start of 1988
when the new Law of State Enterprises went into effect. This was a major change from the command eco-
nomy. Mandatory output targets for enterprises were replaced by -state orders- and enterprises were gi-
ven substantial freedom regarding the disposition of production in excess of what was called for by the
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particularly regarding wages and bonuses.
By 1990 it was clear to all that economic restructuring was not progressing well. Consumers, In par-
ticular, faced growing shortages, long lines, and empty shelves. These shortages were not caused by a de-
cline in the supply of goods, but rather by large increases in monetary demand that were not accompanied
by more than a very modest increase in the available supply of goods. This increase in monetary demand
resulted partly from Gosbank's financing of greatly increased budgetary deficits and partly from the wa-
ge increases that followed the introduction of the Law of State Enterprises.
In almost any other country, the result of such an expansion of monetary demand would have been
inflation. But in the Soviet Union, where prices were fixed by the government, the results of the supply-
demand imbalance were shortages of goods and a growing monetary overhang. The secondary effects of
the shortages were hoarding, barter, black markets, «dollarization» and restrictions on the internal move-
ment of goods. These trends can be summarily described as the <<barterization» of the Soviet economy.
Barterization disrupted supply links for producers, making the economy still less efficient, and adding to
the shortages. Thus the <<vicious circle" between harterization and shortages continued.
At the Economic Summit in Houston in July 1990 the leaders of the G-7, with the agreement of Pre-
sident Gorbachev, asked four international organizations (the IMF, World Bank , OECD and EBRD - to un-
dertake a study of the Soviet economy.* The objectives of this <<Joint Study" were to make recommenda-
tions for the reform of the Soviet economy and establish the criteria under which Western economic as-
sistance could effectively support such reforms.
In early September 1990, when the (,Joint Study" was starting, there already existed two competing
economic reform programs. They were the (,Shatalin 500 day>> program and the (<Ryzhkov)) program. When
it came to economic reform, the proposals of the group headed by Academician Shatalin were both bolder
and more specific than those of Prime Minister Ryzhkov. But what proved to he an at least equally im-
portant difference between them was that the Prime Minister's program emphasized a strong Union go-
vernment while the «Shatalin» program proposed transferring major powers to the republics. For example,
under the latter all powers of taxation would be vested in the Republican legislatures and the Union would
have to make do with voluntary transfers from the republics.
In September 1990 an attempt was made to reach a compromise between the two programs. The ho-
pe was that the compromise would then to be approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and, follo-
wing this, by each of the 15 republics. The uncertainty and drift on economic reform policies would thus
be brought to an end. However, this effort at a compromise failed. The outcome was limited to the « Pre-
sidential Guidelines" for stabilization and economic reform which were approved by the Supreme Soviet
on October 19. But they were never approved at the republican level. And these guidelines were more of
an extended statement of objectives than they were a detailed program for reaching these objectives.
The <<Presidential Guidelines" did, however, include a description of the state of the economy and
the society in October 1990:
(,The position of the economy continues to deteriorate. The volume of production is declining.
Economic links are being broken. Separatism is on the increase . The consumer market is in dire
straits. The budget deficit and the solvency of the government are now at critical levels. Antisocial
behavior and crime are increasing. People are finding life more and more difficult and are losing their
interest in work and their belief in the future . The economy is in very great danger. The old admi-
nistrative system of management has been destroyed but the impetus to work under a market system
is lacking" .
The situation, accurately described in this quotation, called for a strong economic program. But, des-
pite a worsening economic situation, it has so far proved impossible to reach a consensus on what this pro-
gram should be.
Late in 1990 there was a (,conservative- or aright wing- reaction to the deteriorating situation. A
number of important economic reformers left their high governmental posts. Factors contributing to this
reaction no doubt included (i) some discrediting of the economic reform effort from the apparent failure
* The conclusions of the -Joint Study " are summarized in The Economy oJthe USSR -Summary and Recommenda-
tions, published in December 1990 by the World Bank on behalf of the four organizations . The collected background papers
prepared as part of the study are contained in the three volume report , A Study of the Soviet Economy, published by the OECD
on behalf of the four organizations.
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of the earlier partial reforms, (ii) growing concerns regarding ethnic conflicts and the possible fragmenta-
tion of the USSR, (iii) the proposed cuts in the military budget, which would seriously effect the defense
industries, and (iv) a not surprising fear of loss of power by those in the traditionally powerful state and
party organs. On the last point, however, it should also be noted that a substantial number of the traditio-
nal Communist Party nomenklatura are choosing to join in the reform and are becoming entrepreneurs in
the expected new order.
Reacting to both the serious developments in the Baltics and the failure to make progress with a se-
rious economic reform effort, by the end of January 1991 the major Western industrial countries were put-
ting their plans for both food aid and technical assistance <<on the back burner. During the first half of
1991 the economy continued to deteriorate. Reported industrial production fell by I I% from the levels of
the previous year. This was due to a variety of causes; they include the collapse of exports to Central and
Eastern Europe, declines in arms production, strikes and ethnic disputes, and added difficulties in obtai-
ning needed inputs as a result of the worsening balance of payments situation. The continuing decline in
petroleum production and exports, and substantial debt service obligations combined with a reluctance of
Western hankers to extend new credits, contributed to the balance of payments problems. However, in re-
cent months the prospects for economic reform have improved. In April food subsidies were drastically
reduced, a necessary if not sufficient step to get the budget deficit under control, and the first draft of an
,,Anti-Crisis Program» was circulated by Prime Minister Pavlov. On April 23 the <>9+1 agreement>> took
place; in this agreement nine of the republics agreed to work with the Union government to complete an
acceptable anti-crisis economic reform program and a new Union Treaty. The six republics not participa-
ting in the <<9+1 agreement>> account for less than 10% of the population and economic activity of the pre-
sent Soviet Union.
In May a group of Soviet economists began work with several Harvard and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology professors in an effort to come up with a reform program, covering political as well as eco-
nomic changes, that they hoped would be acceptable to both the republics of the USSR and the major Wes-
tern nations. The Soviet team was led by Grigory Yavlinsky, who had been Chairman of the Commission
on Economic Reform of the Russian Federation as well as a major contributor to the <<Shatalin 500 day,>
program. Their proposal, titled <<Window of Opportunity: Joint Program for Western Cooperation in the
Soviet Transformation to Democracy and the Market Economy>>, became better known as the <<Grand Bar-
gain,) because of its emphasis upon large scale economic assistance from the West.
In July President Gorbachev met in London with the G-7 heads of state at the conclusion of their an-
nual Economic Summit. The Soviet leader emphasized his country's determination to establish a market
economy that would be integrated in the world economy. Although the London meeting did not result in
any agreements on financial assistance, there were both supportive words and promises of technical assis-
tance (to be facilitated by a special relationship with the IMF and World Bank). The expressions of sup-
port from the G-7 were also backed up by plans for continuing discussions of Soviet economic reform ef-
forts.
Some Political Background
Before considering the economic reform recommendations of the <Joint Study,,, we should remind
ourselves of some of' the political factors that condition the prospects for economic reform in the USSR.
Foremost is the strong revival of ethnic and national aspirations in the USSR - which is a federation of
republics with different cultures, languages, and economic levels. Many of the republics (and particularly
the large Russian Federation) are themselves far from ethnically homogenous, so there are tensions within
as well as between the republics.
Following the reduction in controls by Moscow, the country has been going through a period of eth-
nie euphoria. It is not yet clear whether this initial euphoria is now diminishing. Some believe it is. But
others think that the pendulum is still swinging towards republican independence. They believe that it may
he several years before it will be possible to breing the republics hack into a <<common market>> or « sin-
gle economic space>> (perhaps along the lines of the European Community in 1992). The challenge facing
both Union and republican leaders is how to combine political diversity with economic unity.
Many forces in the republics seek economic as well as political independence. But economic inde-
pendence, or autarky, would prove costly in terms of economic well-being. The various republics are in
fact heavily interdependent. In addition to comparative advantage based upon natural and human resour-
ces, Soviet industrial planners added to this interdependence by concentrating production of particular ma-
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would he costly to all concerned. Indeed , the restrictions on the internal movement of goods that ate part
of the present ( barterization - of the economy , are adding significantly to the present disruption of the eco-
nomy.
The <<9+1 agreement - of April 23 and subsequent progress towards a new Union Treaty offer some
basis for hope . However , in July the Russian Federation approved the draft Union Treaty only after ente-
ring reservations which would leave the individual republics responsible for foreign trade and leave the
Union government without powers of taxation . At the same time the Ukraine simply postponed conside-
ration of the treaty for two months , although agreement on a new Union Treaty is clearly a matter of ur-
gency since a political understanding , probably in the form of a new Union Treaty, is a prerequisite for
economic reform.
Some of the contentious issues include ( i) the allocation of tax powers and expenditure responsibili-
ties between the Union and the republics , ( ii) ownership of natural resources and state owned enterprises,
(iii) measures necessary to maintain common fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies, and i iv) an
agreement to prohibit interrepublican trade barriers . The reform is proceeding on the basis that the repu-
blics are in fact sovereign , but that those participating in the new Union Treaty thereby delegate certain
powers to the center which will , among other things , be adequate to maintain a single economic space.
It remains to be seen whether this will prove possible . There is substantial verbal support for main-
taining a << single economic space-, but there seems to he a lack of understanding regarding the economic
institutions and policies required . Republics already have their own central banks which they do not want
to be totally subservient to the USSR ' s Gosbank ; some of them want the power of emission , and at pre-
sent an effort is being made to get them to settle for the authority to set their own reserve requirements.
The currently highly overvalued commercial exchange rate (which is about 1/15 of the official rate offe-
red to tourists ) results in a situation where <<foreign exchange retention - is demanded by republics as well
as wanted by exporting firms ; it is uncertain whether these pressures can he overcome by anything less
than a unified exchange rate responsive to market forces combined with current account convertibility.
There continues to he strong opposition to giving the Union government any taxation powers; even the Pri-
me Minister's draft (Anti-Crisis Program - has the Union at least partly dependent upon voluntary upward
revenue transfers from the republics . The restrictions on interrepublican trade are in fact increasing (as re-
publics respond to shortages by prohibiting (exports,, to neighboring republics ). Moreover , the tendency
for vertical integration in Soviet enterprises has its parallel in the desires of some individual republics to
minimize dependence upon << imports,, from other republics that are considered unreliable sources of supply.
Comprehensive Economic Reform
Much of the debate over economic reform programs in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as in the
Soviet Union, has been in terms of the choice between (shock therapy- or the (big bang- on one hand
and (gradualism>> on the other. The <<Joint Study- outlines an economic reform program for the USSR
which it describes as (,radical-, but which perhaps is better described as (comprehensive-. While it is cer-
tainly not a ><gradualistic>> approach, it isn't really a <<big bang>> or <<shock therapy>> either. Some of the re-
forms are necessarily going to take substantial time to implement; reform of the banking and legal systems
are examples. Moreover, the recommendations include a number of transitional measures designed to sof-
ten the initial shocks of reform. <<Comprehensive>> is perhaps the best simple descriptor since the recom-
mended program clearly calls for simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, actions in a great many areas.
Such a comprehensive reform program is both politically and administratively difficult. The close re-
lationships between the various components, however, make a comprehensive approach essential Many
of the USSR's recent economic problems result from the fact that the reforms of the past three years ha-
ve been partial and therefore inconsistent. Thus Soviet experience with Perestroika supports that proposi-
tion that the results of partial reform can be worse than those of no reform at all. As was stated in last Oc-
tober's Presidential Guidelines, the old system of economic management has been largely destroyed, but
a new one has not yet been put in place.
The elements in the economic reform program outlined in the <<Joint Study- can be classified under
three headings:
(I ) strengthened macroeconomic management,
(2) systemic reform, and
(3) transitional measures (to soften <<shocks-)
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the elements of macroeconomic management arc the Consentional ones. although in the ca"c of the
Soviet Union they involve structural reforms as well as policy changes. In the fiscal area it is not simply
a matter of adequate fiscal discipline, but of restructuring intergovernmental fiscal relations and of basic
reforms in the tax system. In the monetary area, it is not simply it matter of tighter monetary policy, but
of establishing an effective central hank with adequate tools for monetary management. Regarding inco-
mes policy, there is a need to maintain reasonable floors and ceilings on real wages; there is also a need
to develop collective bargaining procedures, and to adjust nominal wages and wage differentials as subsi-
dies are eliminated and greater attention is paid to differences in productivity.
In the Soviet Union macroeconomic stabilization will not be simply a matter of tightening policies
with the usual existing policy instruments. By and large, the necessary instruments and institutional arran-
gements have yet to be put in place. There are important political aspects to this process. Indeed, in 1991
fiscal management has been seriously compromised because some republics have been holding hack, and
using for their own purposes, tax collections which previously had been transferred to the Union to meet
expenses of the center. The result is a much larger than expected consolidated state budget deficit in the
first half of the year - although no one seems to know exactly how large, because some republics have
not provided the financial data necessary to fully evaluate the situation.
The «Joint Study» discusses six elements of systemic reform. They are:
(1) Price liberalization. As well as ending most administered prices this involves (a) using market clearing
prices (rather than orders from state planners) to allocate available supplies of goods and to signal producers re-
garding what the market wants, and also (b) progressively bringing Soviet prices in line with world prices.
(2) Enterprise reform. This includes (a) privatization, beginning with retail trade and services, who-
lesale distribution and smaller manufacturing plants; (b) ,commercialization,) of those government enter-
prises which it may not be possible or convenient to privatize in the short run; and (c) the encouragement
of new private sector activities.
(3) Financial sector reform. New financial institutions are needed to mobilize saving and to replace
central planners in allocating savings among various investment possibilities. Initially the emphasis will
be upon the establishment of a commercial banking system, but other types of financial intermediaries and
markets also need to be developed. The creation of a commercial banking system involves training ,com-
mercial bankers>> and establishing the needed system of prudential regulation and supervision.
(4) «International economic relations,. Included in this general heading are reforms of trade, ex-
change rate and foreign investment institutions and policies. Trade should be liberalized and a unified ex-
change rate, responsive to market forces, and current account convertibility should be established as ra-
pidly as feasible. Foreign investment needs to be encouraged (although here it should be recognized that
what matters is not just specific legislation on foreign investment, but also the general investment clima-
te and the overall legal framework).
(5) The .social safety net. The most immediate issues are an adequate system of unemployment com-
pensation and assistance to the unemployed with retraining and job placement. But the safety net also re-
quires improving social protection for vulnerable groups, reform of the pension system, disability insu-
rance, and other aspects of social security.
(6) The legal framework. The creation of a legal framework for a market economy includes establis-
hing a commercial code and a judicial system to enforce contracts, the clarification of property rights, and
the elimination of laws clearly inconsistent with a market economy. (For example, until recently the law
on ,economic speculation>> made it a criminal offense to buy something with the intention of selling it at
a profit). Of fundamental importance is bringing to an end the <war of laws>> between the Union and the
republics (during which each has claimed that its own legislation would be binding in the event of con-
flicts between Union and republican law).
The <<Joint Report,) discusses a number of transitional measures that could be taken to reduce the de-
clines in household real incomes and the losses in output and employment which must be expected as part
of any major stabilization and restructuring program. The report proposes one for households and another
for enterprises. Regarding households, it was recommended that the prices of urban transport, and of ot-
her natural monopolies, continue under administrative controls while gradually being adjusted to realistic
levels. Housing rents are also a special case, where adjustments should come slowly and as part of an ove-
rall reform including the financing and construction of housing. In addition, the report suggested that, as
a way of protecting vulnerable groups, a strictly rationed amount of some basic consumption goods might
continue to be subsidized. Any quantities consumed beyond the ration would have to be bought at market
clearing prices. The total subsidy involved, of course would have to be held to a level consistent with sa-
tisfactory fiscal management.
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duct exports , and also for a limited number of imports - transitional export and import taxes might
he imposed to slow the move to world market prices. The future move to world market prices would
be clear, but enterprises would be given some time to adjust to the new situation ( e.g., a 3 - year tran-
sition period ). The use of export and import taxes , rather than price controls , would mean that the allo-
cation of the resources involved could he done by the market rather than requiring administrative in-
terventions.
Another transitional measure for enterprises would be a program to assist in the physical , financial,
and managerial restructuring of state enterprises . Intervention in these areas by the state is often questio-
ned, partly because of the fear that it would become a continuing subsidy for inefficient firms , and partly
because of doubts about the capacity of any public sector administrators to make the necessary decisions.
On balance , however , such intervention seems essential if the transitional losses in output and employment
are to be held to acceptable levels. There are major issues regarding the conversion of the defense indus-
tries and the down sizing of heavy industries where administrative intervention is desirable . Also, there are
many potentially viable firms that have inherited heavy debt - equity ratios and which, for this reason alo-
ne, probably could not survive the tightening of credit that would accompany the reform effort . There is a
danger of a hiatus in credit availabilities while the banking system is being restructured ( as well as a ques-
tion on whether the newly created commercial banks should be asked to undertake the risks involved in
all industrial restructuring activities ). Restructuring can also serve other important objectives ; in particu-
lar, some state enterprises will need to be « demonopolized » (by dividing them into a number of compe-
ting firms ) before they can be privatized . It would be a mistake to leave all of' these restructuring problems
to be solved by quite imperfect markets . Some kind of state restructuring agency , which can provide both
technical and financial assistance, seems necessary.
It was previously noted that the case for comprehensive reform rest on the interrelationships betwe-
en the many different aspects of macroeconomic and systemic reform . For example , it is widely accepted
that one cannot successfully carry out systemic reforms, particularly where price policy is a key element,
in a seriously inflationary environment . In the Soviet Union the reverse of this proposition is equally cle-
ar, i.e., the fiscal and monetary situation cannot be brought under control without undertaking systemic
changes particularly those related to enterprise reform and pricing policy . In addition to drastic reduc-
tions in subsidies, a «hard budget constraint >> must be placed on state enterprises - i.e., there must he an
end to the covering of enterprise deficits by budget transfers or readily available bank loans . This means
making state enterprises financially and managerially independent - either by privatization or <<commer-
cialization».
However, if state enterprises are going to be privatized or commercialized , their manager must have
the authority to raise prices and dismiss unnecessary workers. This requires both substantial price libera-
lization and the establishment of an adequate unemployment compensation system . Especially in the So-
viet Union , where production of manufactured goods tends to be concentrated in a relatively few firms,
one can hardly liberalize prices without simultaneously taking steps to encourage a competitive environ-
ment. For retail trade, rapid privatization will help create the necessary competitive environment, at the
wholesale level it will he necessary to encourage the formation of competing channels of distributi<m. For
tradeable goods, much could he accomplished by a combination of import liberalization ( accompanied by
current account convertibility), demonopoliz.ation>> as part of the industrial restructuring , and the ending
of <<profile restrictions >> where they seriously inhibit firms from changing their product lines.
Whether accomplished by the privatization and commercialization of existing state enterprises or by
the growth of new private sector activities , the financial and managerial autonomy of enterprises will ha-
ve to he accompanied by financial sector reform . The central planners' allocations of capital for new in-
vestments need to be replaced by banking and other financial market decisions. Reform of the legal sys-
tem is equally necessary . Although it will take some time to complete the legal reform , the evolving mar-
ket system will not work satisfactorily in the absence of a suitable legal framework . There are other
relationships which must also he taken into account . For example, the authorities are under pressure to dis-
tribute the state's assets while keeping it's liabilities. Insofar as this is allowed to happen, future macroe-
conomic management will become even more difficult . Thus, when approaches to the privatization and
commercialization of state enterprises are considered , it will he necessary to keep in mind not only the ne-
ed to reform ownership and management , but also the need to mobilize financial resources . These resour-
ces will he needed to recapitalize the commercial banks ( many of which have very weak portfolios), to
help finance industrial restructuring and unemployment compensation expenditures related to the reform
program , and also to capitalize the pensions funds.
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Thus, we see that starting with one element in the reform program, bringing the fiscal and monetary
situation under control, leads us to the need to simultaneously undertake reform in the other areas as well.
Thus the general answer to questions about the timing and sequencing of reform measures seems to be that
postponing any of these major elements in the reform program is likely to create more problems than it
will solve. While enterprise reform and price reform are both sine qua non, they must be supported by
strengthened macroeconomic management, by the other elements of systemic reform, and by transitional
measures that cushion the inevitable shocks from restructuring.
The area where <<gradualism>> is most often proposed is that of price liberalization. It is argued that,
while prices should be adjusted, they should also be kept under administrative controls - because of the
problems of monopoly power and the time needed to strengthen market infrastructure and institutions. In-
deed, many of those participating in the <<Joint Study>> began with this point of view. But, in the course of
the study, they became convinced that a widespread price liberalization was the best and perhaps the only
way to end the present disruption of the economy from hoarding, barterization, and harriers to internal tra-
de. Thus the recommendation of widespread price liberalization is not made with the expectation that it
will result in the ,efficiency prices>> discussed in books on the theory of perfect competition. Instead, it is
a recommendation to adopt market clearing prices in order to move the economy from what is becoming
a barter economy to an exchange economy.
Price liberalization would no doubt result in some further inflation, since changes in relative prices
can hardly be accomplished without an increase in the general level of prices. Price liberalization would,
of course, have to be supported by fairly tight monetary and fiscal policies, or it would indeed contribute
to a dangerous inflationary spiral. But price liberalization, in the sense of moving to market clearing pri-
ces, seems to be the best if not the only way to restore the value of the ruble - in the simple sense that
the ruble would again be a medium of exchange for buying and selling goods and services. This would go
a long way toward reversing the recent declines in production which have resulted from the difficulties in
maintaining supply relationships in an increasingly barterized economy.
External Assistance
The report recommends that the Western nations provide economic assistance to support the Soviet
Union's reform efforts, but suggests that a two-stage approach be taken. At present, and until a compre-
hensive reform program is under implementation, it is proposed that aid be limited to three kinds. These
are (I) food and other humanitarian assistance, (2) technical assistance, and (3) loans for projects in a few
special areas. The areas recommended for project lending are energy, environment, and perhaps help in re-
moving some infrastructure bottlenecks such as telecommunications.
Once a comprehensive economic reform program was introduced and under implementation, exter-
nal lenders would have greater confidence that both a higher level of assistance and other forms of eco-
nomic assistance would be used effectively. With the exception of technical assistance, economic assis-
tance to the Soviet Union is expected to take the form of loans on normal commercial terms. If such bo-
rrowing on commercial terms were not used effectively, the borrower as well as the lender would suffer,
because it would leave the borrower with a higher debt burden, but without the increase in productive ca-
pacity and exports that are needed to service the increased indebtedness. Thus both the borrower and the
lender should be concerned that any large scale external assistance contributes to improving economic ef-
ficiency and output.
Concurrent with the implementation of a comprehensive reform program, it would be desirable to su-
port that program with balance of payments assistance and with project assistance in additional areas. Al-
though a unified exchange rate would have to be responsive to market forces, balance of payments assis-
tance through a stabilization fund could be helpful in providing initial support for the current account con-
vertibility of the ruble. Also, at the outset of price liberalization it would be useful to provide balance of
payments assistance to help assure adequate supplies of many goods whose prices were being liberalized.
At such times there is a tendency for exchange rates and prices to move erratically and to «overshoot», but
these tendencies can be kept under control if a stabilization fund and additional supplies of imported
goods are available.
The inflow of direct private investment should be expected to increase once a comprehensive reform
program was under implementation. However, expectations seem exaggerated regarding both the likely le-
vel of private foreign investment and the extent to which it offers a solution to the economic problems of
the Soviet Union. Particularly important for potential foreign investors will be the clarity of the legal fra-
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settlement of investment disputes, the most important factors to encourage foreign direct investments are
the same ones that encourage domestic private investments . The most important role of foreign direct in-
vestment will he as a source of ideas and information on organization , technology , and access to foreign
markets Insofar as getting foreign exchange is the main objective , foreign direct investment is in far t a re-
latively expensive form of financing.
The ><Joint Study - concludes with the following : -... we must stress that balance of payments assis-
tance should accompany the introduction of a major and comprehensive reform program . Without such a
reform , additional financial resources would be of little or no lasting value . With it, assistance could pro-
vide important support during a time of difficult transition to integration of the economy of the USSR in-
to the world economy , with benefits for all partners-.
The Prospects for the Future
There is little likelihood that the present economic disruption can be brought to an end, and output
restored to more normal levels, in the short run, i.e., in the next twelve or eighteen months. Even if a coin-
prehensive reform program is adopted, one must anticipate further declines in output and employment du-
ring the initial period of transition and industrial restructuring. However, if such a reform program is not
adopted, the problems are likely to be even more severe as the economy would continue its present down-
ward course. An added source of concern is agricultural production in 1991; there was a large decline in
the area planted in the spring, so the fall harvest could be seriously reduced. Another complicating factor
is the fiscal deterioration in the first half of 1991 and the resulting increase in the monetary overhang.
There are two favorable aspects of the restructuring process that should be noted. One is that a subs-
tantial part of the decline in output is falling upon the military industries. While this affects employment
and incomes, it does not reduce the total level of goods and services available to meet private consump-
tion needs. Indeed, the latter will be increased insofar as the military industries can be converted to the
production of civilian goods. The second favorable aspect is the improvement in supply links, and conse-
quently in economic efficiency and output, that can be expected as a result of introducing market clearing
prices and moving from the present « barterization,> to an exchange economy. However, these two Iavora-
ble factors will not be sufficient to offset the transitional costs that are inevitable as the Soviet economy
establishes a market system and becomes increasingly integrated with the world economy.
The experience in other countries suggests that economists, both the foreign advisers and those in the
countries concerned, have been overly optimistic about the ease and speed of the transition from a cen-
trally planned to a market economy. There is also a tendency by some to turn «the free market- into a new
ideology, rather than to see it as a practical way of organizing affairs that solves many problems, but cer-
tainly not all of them. There are problems of <<market failure- just as there are problems of «government
failure». The state needs to play an important positive role during the transition and beyond. Even in the
most market oriented economies, the state has responsibilities in regulating economic activity, in provi-
ding economic and social infrastructure, and in maintaining acceptable minimum welfare levels. Maintain-
ing the appropriate role of the state can be difficult in a society where the state has in many respects dis-
credited itself as a result of its past behavior and failures. It will be even more difficult in the Soviet Union
where there are additional reasons for strong centrifugal forces.
Essentially political issues, particularly ethnic tensions, clearly make it difficult to get the necessary
consensus on an economic reform program. Moreover, in the republics many are more interested in the
descentralization of power from than in economic reform. They are anxious to see the power to make eco-
nomic decisions move from Moscow to the capital of their republic or to its major municipalities. But they
are less interested in having this power move to enterprise managers whose actions would be guided and
disciplined by market forces. The problem is illustrated by the remarks of one official who announced that
«state orders>> to enterprises would he ended - and be replaced by republican and municipal orders. This
is not only a desire to exercise power. After over seventy years of a command economy, many simply do
not understand what is involved in moving the Soviet Union to a market economy that is integrated in the
world economy.
Just as it was not possible to reach a compromise between the -Shatalin- and ,Ryzhkov>> proposals
for economic reform in the Fall of 1990, it was not possible to reach a compromise between the <<Grand
Bargain- and the -Anti-Crisis>> programs prior to the G-7 meeting in the Summer of 1991. Indeed, it is far
from clear if the republics (even nine of them) are willing to give the central government the degree of
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economic authority that will be necessary to maintain a single economic space for these republics. A pos-
sible scenario is a relatively prolonged and difficult learning period>> during which many economic poli-
cies are likely to be inconsistent and inadequate. Getting safely through such a period would be a test of
both Union and republican leadership. Despite the uncertain near-term outlook, there is reason to hope that
in the longer run movement towards a market economy integrated into the world economy will prove irre-
versible. No one should be surprised if, at times, progress in interrupted (as it was for some months be-
ginning late in 1990). While external financial assistance at appropriate points may ease the transition, the
fundamental and most difficult problems can be solved only by the Soviet people.
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